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Summary 
This paper estimates the effect of environmental regulation on industry location and 
compares it with other determinants of location such as agricultural, education and R&D 
country characteristics. The analysis is based on a general empirical trade model that 
captures the interaction between country and industry characteristics in determining 
industry location. The Johnson-Neyman technique is used to fully explicate the nature of the 
conditional interactions. The model is applied to data on 16 manufacturing industries from 
13 European countries. The empirical results indicate that the pollution haven effect is 
present and that the relative strength of such an effect is of about the same magnitude as 
other determinants of industry location. A significant negative effect on industry location is 
observed only at relatively high levels of industry pollution intensity. 
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1. Introduction  
Does environmental regulation have a significant negative impact on industry location? 
This question is at the heart of the trade and environment debate. A positive answer to 
this question might give grounds to worry regarding a host of interrelated issues: the 
emergence of ‘pollution havens’ in environmentally lax countries, harm to 
competitiveness in environmentally strict countries, and a consequent attempt by 
jurisdictions to undercut each other’s environmental standards. Such issues have served 
as an additional impediment to the conclusion of the latest round of WTO trade 
liberalization that started in Seattle in 1999 [36,10]. Industrialists in the EU are also 
worried about the extent to which the EU Emissions Trading Scheme impairs their 
competitiveness [33]. Similarly in the US, competitiveness concerns were raised during 
the debate on the impact of North American Free Trade. Critics argued that differential 
environmental standards across Canada, Mexico and US would result in massive capital 
flight to Mexico which would cause more overall pollution. 
The foregoing topics have received considerable attention in the academic literature 
and much of the studies are collected under the denominator of the so-called Pollution 
Haven Hypothesis (PHH).
1 This hypothesis purports that changes in environmental 
regulation results in a relocation of dirty goods production from countries with stringent 
environmental regulation to those with lax environmental regulation. While the 
hypothesis is intuitively plausible, reviews of the empirical literature have concluded that 
the evidence is mixed or that the correlation between environmental regulation and 
industry performance is weak (see, for e.g., [9,14]. Taylor [34] has further pointed out 
that empirical work on the PHH has been troubled by, among other things, the fact that 
researchers at times mistake a pollution haven effect for the pollution haven hypothesis. 
Pollution haven effects occur if differences in the levels of environmental regulatory 
stringency affect the inter-jurisdictional distribution of polluting industries. Such effects, 
if present, are only one determinant of industry location. The PHH however postulates 
that the interaction between environmental regulation and pollution intensity is the most 
important determinant for firm location, or at least more important than other 
determinants, such as the availability of capital and skilled labor. This leads – it is 
hypothesised – to a “race to the bottom”, where jurisdictions have incentives to lower 
environmental standards to maintain or increase their share of those industries most 
affected by such standards. 
The differential stringency of environmental regulation is only one of several 
motives for location choices and hence calls in the recent literature for empirical work 
weighing the relative strength of these different motives
2 [34]. Our aim is to present a 
way of undertaking such an assessment. The analysis in this paper complements those of 
                                                      
1 See, for example, a recent edited volume dedicated to the Pollution Haven Hypothesis [11] 
 
2 Such calls also remind us of a seemingly trivial but a more general point about hypothesis testing. Strictly 
speaking, the question of how accurate a hypothesis is necessitates an explicit statement of an alternative 
hypothesis with which the maintained hypothesis is to be compared. In the absence of an alternative 
hypothesis, normal statistical methods of inference are not applicable and rejection/acceptance of the 
maintained hypotheses is a matter of mere judgment [19, pp. 45-47].   3
Becker and Henderson [4], Greenstone[12], and List and McHone [22] who have 
documented evidence of the pollution haven effect using county level plant data 
respectively for the US and New York State. Becker and Henderson study four pollution 
intensive industries, Greenstone uses dummies for dirty as opposed to clean industries, 
and List and McHone compare the location decisions of polluting new plants in 
attainment (stringent) and non-attainment (lax) counties.
3  We propose an alternative 
approach by explicitly including a continuous variable of pollution intensity per 
industries so that we can address the question: ‘how polluting must an industry be to 
respond to environmental regulation?’, a refinement of the typical question in the 
literature: ‘are polluting industries affected by environmental regulation?’. Also, we 
include other determinants of firm location so that we can compare the different 
determinants and distinguish between the pollution haven hypothesis and the pollution 
haven effect. In this sense, this paper also complements Levinson and Taylor’s study [20] 
which, like this paper, uses a continuous measure of pollution intensity as an explanatory 
variable but it does not compare environmental policy with other location determinants.
4  
Our paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we integrate two strands 
of literature; one from economic geography and one from environmental economics. We 
employ a general empirical trade model that has recently appeared in the new economic 
geography literature but has not previously been used in the pollution haven literature. 
The model analyzes the joint role of country and industry characteristics in determining 
industry location. Specifically, it estimates how high and low levels of country 
characteristics interact with high and low intensities of the corresponding industry 
attributes in location decisions. The model allows us to supplement and expand recent 
findings in the empirical PHH literature that the impact of environmental regulation tends 
to be “heterogeneous both spatially and across industry” [27, p. 261; 28]. The model 
complements the analyses by Cole and Elliot [6] and Chintrakarn and Millimet [5] as it 
uses explicit variables for environmental policy and pollution intensity as a driver of 
location, rather than studying the pollution haven effect indirectly by regressing emission 
levels against trade intensity, income, the capital/labor ratio, and their various interaction 
effects. 
Second, we elaborate on the interpretation of the conditional effects associated with 
the interactive terms in our empirical model. The most common method for probing 
interactive effects is to test significance of coefficients at specific levels of the predictors. 
In our case, the standard approach would be to test significance for location dependence 
on environmental policy stringency, given a specific level of the industry’s pollution 
intensity. We, more broadly, present the dependence relation over the whole range of 
                                                      
3 Our paper also complements papers in a related strand of the literature such as List and Co [21], Keller 
and Levinson [16] and Xing and Kolstad [38] who focus respectively on US inbound and outbound FDI. 
Each of these papers compares regression results for dirty and clean industries (or all manufacturing) and 
obtains some evidence of the pollution haven effect. 
4 Levinson and Taylor [20] also incorporate endogeneity in their study arguing that allowing for 
endogeneity helps reveal evidence of the pollution haven effect. However List et al. [23], who find larger 
pollution haven effects than previously reported, argue that these greater effects are not due to the treatment 
of environmental regulation as exogenous or endogenous. Admittedly, endogeneity is a potential problem 
that may bias our results but we put aside, for now, the endogeneity issue and empirically assesses the 
relative role of the interaction between industries’ pollution intensity and the stringency of environmental 
policy against other determinants of industry location.   4
industry’s pollution intensity and employ the Johnson-Neyman technique to calculate 
regions of significance and confidence bands for evaluating the conditional effects.  
Third, as we apply our approach to data on manufacturing industries from European 
countries, the analysis gives us a picture of country heterogeneity within Europe and its 
consequences for firm location. The dataset covers countries with stringent environmental 
regulation like Finland and Sweden as well as countries with relatively lax environmental 
regulation such as Greece and Belgium. With respect to industries, the dataset includes 
pollution intensive industries such as Industrial Chemicals and clean industries such as 
Radio, TV & Communication. The results indicate that the pollution haven effect can be 
uncovered, and that the relative strength of such an effect is of about the same magnitude 
as other determinants of industry location. Further investigation of the conditional effects 
indicates that a significant negative effect on industry location is observed only at 
relatively high levels of pollution intensity. Thus, the focus on environmental stringency 
in this literature is only half the story: both stringency of environmental regulation and 
industry pollution intensity matter. The findings we report suggest that for the PHH 
literature the interaction between the differential stringency of environmental regulation 
and differences in industry pollution intensity is an essential element  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the econometric 
model. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses the empirical results and Section 
5 concludes. 
2. Theory and empirical model 
The model aims to investigate the relevance of various factors in industry’s 
location. In particular, we want to know why some countries attract a high share of 
certain industries, while other countries have a much lower share. Formally, we search 
for the determinants of the share of country i in the total manufacturing production of 
industry  k, that is si,k defined as  ∑ = ' , ' , i k i k i ik z z s , where zi,k measures the size of 
industry k at country i, and the country label with prime (i') is used to sum over all 
countries. 
Trade theorists’ discussions of industry location are informed by two strands of 
literature. Comparative advantage arguments based on the role of factor endowments can 
be derived from Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) models. Recent theoretic work has extended the 
standard HO models to accommodate environmental factors where cross-country 
differences in the stringency of environmental regulation play a role in trade patterns, e.g. 
[1,7,8,9]. New economic geography (NEG), by contrast, stresses the importance of 
increasing returns, market access and upstream and downstream linkages. NEG predicts 
that while activity will be dispersed when transport costs are either ‘very high’ or ‘very 
low’, clustering of industries occur when transport costs are ‘intermediate’.
5 The HO and 
NEG theories should be regarded as complementary and their relative importance for 
industrial location outcomes is thus an empirical issue.  
Recently, Midelfart-Knarvik et al. [26] developed an empirical model for the 
location of European industry that incorporates both types of effects, i.e. comparative 
advantage and market access. They estimate a model that takes account of the HO 
                                                      
5 See, e.g., Krugman and Venables [18].   5
arguments by relating the factor intensities of industries to the factor endowments of 
countries. The NEG story is captured by examining how the share of intermediates in 
costs, the share of sales to industrial users, and scale economies interact with market 
potential in determining location. 
We extend Midelfart-Knarvik et al.’s [26] econometric model and include 
environmental factors. Countries are heterogeneous in various characteristics such as 
endowments of natural resources and skilled labor, and proximity to markets. We add to 
these country characteristics the relative stringency of environmental regulation. 
Similarly, industries differ in their various attributes such as the intensity of use of 
production factors like skilled labor, and their reliance on intermediate inputs. We add to 
these attributes the pollution intensity of the industry. In equilibrium we expect that 
industries that highly value a regional characteristic locate there. All else equal, a 
technology intensive industry will locate in a region with abundant skilled labor, while 
pollution intensive industries will be attracted to countries with a relatively lax 
environmental regulation. In the context of the PHH literature, the relevant empirical 
question is how strong the interaction is between environmental regulation and pollution 
intensity, relative to the interaction between other country and industry characteristics. 
Central in the model are the potential interaction channels, indexed j. For each 
interaction channel, we have a vector of associated country characteristics x
j, and a 
vector of associated industry attributes y
j. For the skilled-labor interaction channel, x
j 
measures countries’ skilled labor abundance, while y
j measures the industries’ skilled 
labor intensity. For the pollution interaction channel, x
j measures the countries’ 
stringency of environmental regulation (or its inverse, the laxity), while y
j measures the 
industries’ pollution intensity. For each interaction channel, there is a neutral country 
characteristic level χ
j, also referred to as a cut off point, such that a country with this 
characteristic does not specifically attract industries with high or low levels for the 
associated industry attribute. Similarly, there is a neutral industry attribute level γ
j, or cut 
off point, such that an industry with this attribute level does not consider the associated 
country-characteristic in the selection of its location. Using these parameters, Midelfart-
Knarvik et al.’s model can be written as a reduced form equation: 
 
  ,, ln( ) ln( ) ( )( )
jj j jj
j ik i i ik k s c pop x y α βχ γ ε =+ + − − + ∑  ,  (1) 
 
where popi is the population living in country i, α  is a scale coefficient, and β
j measures 
the strength of interaction effect j. The country characteristics and industry attributes are 
chosen such that the interaction coefficients β
j are expected to be positive. Expanding the 
equation we obtain the estimating equation as follows: 
   
  ,, ln( ) ' ln( ) ( ' ' )
jj jj j j j








j, and  '
jj j
j cc β χγ =+ ∑ . After we have estimated β, χ', and γ' 
from (2) we can inverse the procedure and calculate the parameters χ and γ in (1).
6 
                                                      
6 When different interaction effects make use of the same country characteristic or industry attribute, the 
calculation of the cut-off points χ and γ becomes slightly more complicated. See notes to Table 3.   6
We specify seven interaction channels. The first three interaction channels are 
associated with the traditional HO trade model.
7 The fourth interaction channel is the 
environmental variable which is the main concern in this paper. The last three interaction 
channels represent the NEG concerns of the model, namely the pull of centrality 
interacting with scale economies, and forward and backward linkages. In full, the 
interaction channels are: (i) Agricultural production as percentage of GDP times industry 
agricultural input intensity;
8 (ii) Secondary & higher education as percentage population 
times industry skilled labor intensity; (iii) Researchers & Scientists as percentage of labor 
force times industry R&D intensity; (iv) Environmental standard laxity times industry 
pollution intensity; (v) Market potential times industry intermediate input use; (vi) 
Market potential times industry sale to industry; and finally (vii) Market potential times 
industry average plant size. The main hypothesis regarding the new economic geography 
interaction variables is that a firm’s location decision involves consideration of market 
access alongside production costs.
9 In Table 1 we present the country characteristics and 
their association with the interaction channels, and the data sources. In Table 2, we 
present the industry attributes and their association with the interaction channels. 
 
 
3. Interactions and regions of significance  
 
From the location model as in equation (1), we can directly calculate the change in 


















Given a positive interaction coefficient β
j, it is immediately clear from equation (3) 
that the increase of characteristic j in a country increases the share of industry k if that 
industry’s level of attribute j exceeds the attribute’s cut-off level, that is, if 
jj
k y γ > . An 
increase of a country’s characteristic j will repel other industries. For example, countries 
with lax environmental policies may attract pollution-intensive industries and repel clean 
industries, or stated the other way around, countries with strict environmental policies 
may attract clean industries and repel pollution-intensive industries. What is considered a 
clean or a dirty industry is determined by the cut-off value γ
j. An immediately obvious 
comparison of interest therefore is that between the industry’s cut-off points γ
j and the 
mean, maximum, and minimum values of these industry attributes reported in Table 2. 
We do not further discuss the country characteristics cut-off levels χ
j. 
                                                      
7 Capital is ignored because of the assumption of capital mobility across Europe. 
 
8 Following  Midelfart-Knarvik et al. [26], the rationale for taking the variable Agricultural production as % 
GDP instead of the underlying conventional factor inputs such as land is that, since our concern is the 
pattern of manufacturing, agriculture can be considered as an exogenous measure of the ‘endowment of 
agriculture’. 
9 See, e.g., Venables [35].   7
The expression in (3) also reveals that the marginal effect of a change in a country 
characteristic  j on the share of an industry located within it is proportional to the 
interaction coefficient β 
j, and the difference between the industry’s attribute level yk
j and 
the cut-off point γ
j. Estimation of β 
j and γ
j therefore permits these marginal effects to be 
estimated. Substitution of the estimated coefficients β ^ j and γ  ^  'j gives, for any given 
industry attribute level 
j
k y , the variance of the estimated marginal effect in (3): 
 
 
2 ˆˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ var[ ( )] ( ) var[ ] var[ ' ] 2 cov[ , ' ]
jj j j j j jj j
kk k yy y β γβ γ β γ −= + − . (4) 
 
  Thus, estimation of β ^ j and γ  ^ 'j allows us to plot the marginal effect and associated 
confidence interval of environmental policy on industry location, as dependent on the 
industry’s pollution intensity. This approach of calculating regions of significance and 
confidence bands for evaluating conditional effects is known as the Johnson-Neyman (J-
N) technique [13]. Clearly the J-N technique has advantages over the more common 
approach which would involve testing the conditional effects at designated levels of 
environmental stringency (e.g., high, medium, or low) [2]. 
   Although the focus here is environmental (pollution intensity and the stringency of 
environmental regulation) the procedure and insights are general. For example, one could 
estimate the marginal effect of changes in a nation’s level of skilled labour on its share of 
skill -intensive industries. 
4. Data 
We base our analysis on a one-period cross-country cross-industry sample. The 
choice of the period (average of 1990-1994) was dictated by availability of most of the 
explanatory variables.
10 Descriptions of the variables and data sources are presented in 
Tables 1 and 2. The discussion here is limited to some relevant issues not contained in the 
table and a further description of the main variables of interest in this paper, i.e. the 
environmental variables. Data on each of the country characteristics pertain to around the 
year 1990 and are obtained from Midelfart-Knarvik et al. [26]. Input-output data (i.e. 
agricultural intensity, intermediate input intensity and industry sale) are constructed as 
(output) weighted averages of the data for Denmark, Germany, France and the UK for 
1990. The environmental standard laxity variable is constructed as one minus the 
Environmental Sustainability Index (scaled to [0,1]) which is constructed jointly by 
World Economic Forum, Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, and Center for 
International Earth Science Information Network, Columbia University. This index refers 
to the year 2001 and is based on a total of 67 underlying variables (such as environmental 
regulatory stringency, environmental regulatory innovation and number of EIA 
guidelines).
11,12  
                                                      
10 We have also experimented with each of the five individual year values for the left hand side variable. 
The results are fairly similar. 
11 This index is also used in Javorcik and Wei [15]. 
 
12 We have also experimented with an alternative measure of environmental regulation stringency from the 
Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002, published by the World Economic Forum. The results are not   8
We use two alternative measures of pollution intensity. The first measure is taken 
from Low and Yeats [24] who provide estimates of pollution abatement and control costs 
as a share of the value of industry output in the USA for the year 1988. The second 
measure is based on the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) data compiled by the US 
Environmental Protection Agency. The TRI data catalogues releases of various types of 
emissions into air, water, land and underground for each manufacturing industry group in 
the US. Such emissions measured by weight for the year 1990-1995 are averaged and 
normalized by the value of industry shipments for the year 1992.
13 The full data on all the 
explanatory variables are reported in the appendix in Tables A.1 and A.2. 
 
< Tables 1 and 2 about here > 
5. Results and discussion 
Table 3 reports the results of the Ordinary Least Squares estimation of equation (1) 
for four different specifications. Models I and II use the full model with the NEG and HO 
interaction channels, with two different specifications for the industry pollution intensity 
attribute. Models III and IV use only the first four HO variables, again with alternative 
measures of the industry pollution intensity attribute. Models I and III use abatement 
costs, and Models II and IV use industry emissions, as the measure of pollution intensity. 
For all models, the estimated coefficients for the interaction channels β reported in 
Table 3 are expected to have positive signs. The estimations confirm the expectations for 
the HO channels. Thus, industries with large inputs from agriculture tend to locate in 
countries with a large agricultural industries, industries with above-average valued labor 
input tend to locate in countries with an above-average skilled population, R&D intensive 
industries tend to locate in R&D rich countries, and indeed, industries that are relatively 
more pollution intensive (such as Industrial Chemicals and Drugs & Medicines) are 
attracted to countries which have relatively lax environmental standards. We note that 
although the β coefficient for skilled labour is not significant in Table 3, we show later 
that the level of skilled labour supply has a significant positive effect on the share of the 
most skilled-labor intensive industry (see Table 5). 
The additional three NEG variables, however do not all have the expected sign and 
are insignificant. A formal test of comparing the full model with the model of only the 
HO variables (including the environmental variable) amounts to a test of whether the 
estimates of the coefficients of the NEG variables are jointly zero. If so, the parsimonious 
model is preferred. The F statistic (F [7, 187]) for the hypothesis of an HO model is 1.62 
for Model I and 1.81 for Model II which, given a critical value at the 5% significance 
level of 2.01, indicates that the null hypothesis that the HO model is appropriate cannot 
be rejected. We therefore omit the NEG variables and confine further analysis to Models 
III and IV. By comparing models I with III and II with IV, we see that the strength of the 
pollution interaction effect is robust with respect to the inclusion or exclusion of the NEG 
                                                                                                                                                              
reported but confirm our finding of significant positive coefficients for the interaction channel (with the 
two alternative pollution intensity variables discussed below) but gave a wider uncertainty interval for the 
marginal effects per industry as in equation (4). 
13 Our second measure of pollution intensity is also used in Javorcik and Wei [15]. These authors also 
employ an alternative measure of pollution intensity similar to our first measure, i.e. based on pollution 
abatement expenditure.   9
channels. For all other interaction effects, we also find robust results. This insignificance 
of the NEG variables contrasts with the finding of Midelfart-Knarvik et al. [26] who 
report significant estimates for the market potential variable but their findings do not 
seem to be particularly robust as can be seen from Midelfart-Knarvik et al. [25]. 
Using equation (3), a comparison of the industry’s cut-off points with the mean 
value informs us on the effect of the country characteristic on the average industry within 
our sample. The first remarkable finding is that the cut-off point for agricultural intensity 
is above the maximum attribute level observed in the sample. Thus, as equation (3) 
predicts, for all industries within the sample, the industry share in a country decreases as 
agriculture’s contribution to that country’s GDP increases. For the food processing 
industry (the most intensive industry), the decrease is relatively modest, whereas for the 
non-ferrous metal industry (the least agriculture-intensive industry), the effect is very 
large. An explanation for this finding is that, in general, manufacturing and agriculture 
are strongly negatively correlated. For all other factor inputs, the cut-off point is between 
the minimum and maximum industry attribute level, signifying that more intensive 
industries are attracted by the more resource abundant countries, while less intensive 
industries typically locate in countries that are less resource abundant for that specific 
resource. For skilled labor, the cut-off point (1.04) is below the industry’s attribute’s 
mean (1.08), which means that within our sample, on average, industries are attracted by 
countries with higher levels of skilled labor. Regarding R&D intensity, the cut-off point 
(0.04) is also below the mean (0.087) so that, on average, firms are attracted by R&D-rich 
countries. For both measures of pollution intensity, the cut-off points (0.86 and 2.04) are 
above the sample means (0.73 and 1.67) meaning that, on average, firms are not attracted 
by lax environmental policies, or stated inversely, are not deterred by stricter 
environmental policy. This result is a first indication that strict environmental policy does 
not deter manufacturing industries in general. That is, even though the most pollution-
intensive industries show a significant smaller share in countries with strict 
environmental policies, on average, within our sample, industries do not prefer to locate 
in countries with lax environmental policies. 
 
< Table 3 about here > 
 
The coefficients reported in Table 3 do not allow one to assess the relative 
importance of the various interaction channels. To allow such an assessment of the 
relative importance of the various interaction effects, the estimated cut-off points from 
equation (2), as presented in Table 3, are substituted in (1) and the dependent variable and 
independent variables are normalized. Expressed in this manner, the estimated 
coefficients are standardized and hence are comparable. In other words, we are measuring 
here the effects on the dependant variable in terms of standard deviation units. The 
resulting standardized coefficients (which Wooldridge [37, p. 196] refers to as “beta-
coefficients”) are independent of the scaling of the regressors and are reported in Table 4. 
That is, the choice for the unit of measurement for the country characteristics and 
industry attributes does not affect the coefficients reported in Table 4, and thereby the 
explanatory variables are put on equal footing. 
Considering the standardized coefficients reported in Table 4, we note that the 
agriculture interaction remains the single largest determinant for industry location. The   10
interaction between environmental policy and pollution intensity is of next greatest 
magnitude but is, in size, not much larger than the skilled labour and R&D interaction 
effects. The relative importance of the four interaction channels is robust across the four 
model specifications (although only standardized coefficients from Models III and IV are 
reported here). 
 
< Table 4 about here > 
 
The coefficients reported in Table 4 provide a general measure of the relative 
importance of the various interaction effects but we are also interested in the more 
specific strength of the interaction effects for the most intensive industries, that is, we 
may ask how strongly an abundance of skilled labor attracts the most skill-intensive 
industries, compared to how strongly a lax environmental policy attracts the most 
pollution intensive industries. For this, we use equation (3). We recall that the marginal 
effect on the industry share of a change in the country characteristic j is proportional to 
the interaction coefficient β
j as presented in Tables 3 and 4, and to the distance between 
the industry’s attribute level yk
j and the cut-off point γ
j. Thus, for industries above the cut-
off point, an increase in the country characteristic will increase the industry share, while 
for industries below the cut-off point, an increase in the country characteristic will 
decrease the share. Table 5 presents the marginal effects of country characteristics on 
location for the most resource-intensive industries, that is, equation (3) evaluated at the 
maximum industry attribute level. We only report the HO interaction models (III and IV). 
For these models, we find that all four country characteristics are significant determinants 
for location of the most intensive industries, including skilled labour abundance. 
Agricultural abundance does not have the expected positive effect on the location 
of the food processing industry. The sign is negative because the cut-off point is above 
the maximum attribute level observed in the sample, as discussed above. The magnitude 
of the three other country characteristic marginal effects appear similar in Columns (III) 
and (IV), but for a proper comparison, in Columns (III′) and (IV′), we report the marginal 
effects using the standardized independent and dependent variables. Thus, it can be seen 
that in Models III and IV, a one standard deviation increase in the skilled labor supply 
increases the share of the most skilled-labor intensive industry (drugs and medicines) by 
about 0.1 times the standard deviation. The scale of the environmental policy effect for 
the dirtiest industry (industrial chemicals) is similar to this skilled labour effect, but the 
responsiveness of R&D intensive industries to a one standard deviation change of R&D 
abundance is far greater. 
 
< Table 5 about here > 
 
  Figure 1 portrays in more detail the importance of a country’s environmental policy 
on its share of particular industries.
14 It is based on equations (3) and (4) and uses results 
from Model III. It shows the marginal effect of environmental policy on the production 
share conditioned on the pollution intensity of the industry, with a 90% confidence 
interval added. The upward slope of the solid line represents the marginal effect of 
                                                      
14 This Figure was constructed using the web-based tool of Preacher, Curran and Bauer [32] 
(http://www.people.ku.edu/~preacher/interact/mlr2.htm), see also Brambor et al. [3].   11
environmental standard laxity for different levels of pollution intensity, as depicted by 
equation (3).  The figure shows the cut-off point 0.86, where the solid line crosses the x-
axis. For this level of pollution intensity, environmental laxity has no effect on location. 
For the industries to the left of this point a more stringent environmental policy increases 
the industry share.
15 To the right of this point a more environmentally lax policy may 
attract a higher industry share. The 90% confidence intervals around the line permit us to 
evaluate at which values of pollution intensity environmental standard laxity has a 
statistically significant impact on production shares. 
  A lax environmental policy has a statistically significant positive effect on industry 
share when the pollution intensity level is above 1.86, above which there is only one 
pollution intensive industry in our sample.  On the right side of the figure, we find the 
pollution intensive industries such as Industrial Chemicals, (with the highest intensity, 
labelled ‘H’). On the left side of the figure, we find the majority of the industries that are 
less pollution intensive (the average and median value of pollution intensity are shown as 
‘A’ and ‘M’ respectively). The ‘cleanest’ industry with the lowest pollution intensity 
level (Radio, TV and Communication Equipment) is shown by the point labelled ‘L’. 
  The graph indicates that while the pollution haven effect is present its negative 
effect on industry location is significant only at relatively high levels of pollution 
intensity. At moderate levels of pollution intensity, the influence of environmental 
standard would be small compared to other forces, and at low levels of pollution 
intensity, strict environmental standards are not a deterrent at all. 
 
< Figure 1 about here > 
 
Finally, in Table 6 we compare our estimated industry shares with observed shares 
and we calculate counterfactual industry shares: predicted shares if country 
characteristics (e.g. environmental policy) changed. We do this first by comparing 
estimated and actual industry shares for the most intensive industries in terms of each of 
agriculture, skills, R&D and pollution intensity. In each case we compare these actual and 
predicted shares for the most and least abundant countries in the respective input. We 
then simulate these shares if, in each case, the most abundant country would become least 
abundant, and vice versa.  
The comparison of the predicted and actual shares gives an idea of the fit of the 
model. A comparison of the counterfactual with the predicted shares answers the question 
how important the specific country characteristic is in determining the industry share. If 
the most abundant country in a particular factor were to have the level of endowment of 
the least abundant country what would be its share of production? The reverse also holds 
for the case of the least abundant country. With respect to the environmental factor input, 
we find that the model predicts a share of 7.3% of the most pollution intensive industry’s 
production (Industrial chemicals) in the country with the most lax environmental standard 
(Belgium), compared with an actual share of  4.8%. The model predicts a share of only 
                                                      
15 Though in this specific case, there are no industries where strict environmental policy has a significantly 
positive effect on their share, the model does not rule out this possibility. A possible explanation for such a 
positive relationship is that countries with strict environmental policies also have high levels of attractive 
characteristics such as good governance or low corruption levels, see [29,30].   12
0.8% in the most environmentally stringent country (Finland) while the actual figure is 
1.0%.  
If Belgium were to adopt the most stringent environmental regulation from Finland, 
the model predicts a decline of the share by more than half, that is, 4.2% point. If Finland 
were to copy the lax standards of Belgium, it would see its share increase by more than a 
factor 2, that is, 1.2% point. A change in R&D country characteristics has a similar effect 
in the sense that if Sweden would decrease its number of researchers per thousand to the 
level of Greece, its share of the Communication equipment industry is predicted to halve, 
while if Greece could copy Sweden’s research abundance, it would see its share double. 
As both countries are fairly small, in absolute terms the change in industry shares would 
be less compared to the environmental policy change. A change in the abundance of 
skilled labor has somewhat less substantial consequences. 
 
< Table 6 about here > 
6. Concluding remarks 
This paper is an empirical analysis of the extent to which environmental regulation 
influences industry location in Europe vis-à-vis other location determinants, mainly the 
traditional HO factor endowment forces. 
The analysis is based on a general empirical trade model. It has a distinctive feature 
in that it models the theoretically-emphasized joint role of country and industry 
characteristics in determining industry location. The model is applied to data on 16 
manufacturing industries from 13 European countries. The Johnson-Neyman technique 
was used to address the interactive terms in the empirical model and to calculate regions 
of significance and confidence bands for evaluating the conditional effects.  
 This dataset covers countries with stringent environmental regulation like Finland 
and Sweden, and countries with relatively lax environmental regulation such as Greece 
and Belgium. With respect to industries, the dataset includes the most pollution intensive 
industries such as Industrial Chemicals as well as relatively clean industries such as 
Radio, TV & Communication Equipment 
The results indicate that the pollution haven effect can be uncovered, and the 
relative magnitude of this effect is about the same as that of other determinants of 
industry location. This might be interpreted as finding the pollution haven effect but 
failing to support the pollution haven hypothesis.  
Specifically, we find in our sample that whereas an increase in the skilled labour 
supply increases the share of an industry with mean levels of characteristics, in contrast, 
increased environmental regulatory laxity does not result in an increased share of the 
‘average’ industry. However when the most polluting, rather than the average, industry is 
considered, increased environmental regulatory laxity does result in a higher proportion 
of this dirty industry locating there.  The approach presented could be developed in a 
number of ways in future research, for example the issue of endogeneity of 
environmental policy in this framework, and the use of panel data for more robust 
estimation.    13
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  Table 1. Country characteristics 
Variable (Interaction 
channel) 
Definition   Source  Mean  Stand. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Population  Share of EU population living in country i 
(average over 1990-1994) 
OECD 0.076 0.070 0.014 0.219
Agricultural abundance 
(1) 
Value of agricultural output as a share of GDP 
(1994)  
Midelfart-Knarvik et al. [26] 0.047 0.027 0.019 0.125
Skilled labor abundance 
(2) 
Share of population aged 25-59 with at least 
secondary education  (1997) 
Midelfart-Knarvik et al. [26] 0.602 0.178 0.238 0.821
Research & Development 
abundance (3) 
Researchers per 100 labor force (1996)  Midelfart-Knarvik et al. [26] 0.477 0.163 0.200 0.780
Environmental standard 
laxity (4) 
One minus the Environmental Sustainability 
Index/100 (2001) 
World Economic Forum, 
Yale Center for 
Environmental Law and 
Policy, and CIESIN 
0.365 0.093 0.195 0.559
Market potential (5,6,7)  Indictors of market potential based on own and 
trading partners’ GDP in ’00000 £ (around the 
year 1990) 
Midelfart-Knarvik et al. [26] 
 
0.086 0.041 0.023 0.133
Notes: The 13 countries with the values of their respective characteristics are reported in the appendix in Table A.1.  
 Table 2. Industry characteristics  
Variable (Interaction 
channel) 
Definition   Source  Mean  Stand. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Log Industry shares  Average share of industry k in country i over 1991-1994  OECD STAN industrial 
database 1998 




Total use of agricultural input as a share of value of 
production (weighted average of Denmark, Germany, France 
and UK for 1990) 
OECD input-output table, 
1990 
0.019 0.057  0.000  0.234 
Skilled labor intensity (2)  Average pay in industry relative to the pay in manufacturing 
as a whole which is one (1990) 
OECD STAN Indicators 
database 2005 
1.085 0.194  0.706  1.407 
R&D intensity (3)  Research & Development expenditure as a share of value 
added  (1990) 
OECD ANBERD, 1973-1998  0.086  0.113  0.002  0.357 
Pollution intensity 1 (4)  Pollution abatement and control costs as a share of the value 
of industry output in the USA for 1988 
Low and Yeats (1992)  0.733  0.581  0.235  2.170 
Pollution intensity 2 (4)  Weight of releases of toxic substances (average over 1990-
1995 normalized by the value of shipments for 1992) 
US Environmental Protection 
Agency 
1.670 1.874  0.122  5.483 
Intermediate input use 
(5) 
Total use of intermediates as a share of value of production 
(weighted average of Denmark, Germany, France and UK for 
1990) 
OECD input-output table, 
1990 
0.419 0.155  0.000  0.612 
Sales to industry (6) 
 
Sales to domestic industry (as intermediates and exports) as a 
share of value of production (weighted average of Denmark, 
Germany, France and UK for 1990) 
OECD input-output table, 
1990 
0.403 0.224  0.000  0.740 
Plant size (7)  Indicator of economies of scale: number of employees per 
plant (1988) 
Pratten (1988)  4.769  4.559  0.378  15.000 
Notes: The 16 industries (ISIC Rev.2 codes) with the values of their respective characteristics are reported in the appendix in Table A.2. The ‘Petroleum & 
Coal products’ and ‘Other Manufacturing’ industries have been excluded because the former is virtually a natural resource industry and the latter is a 
‘residual’ and cannot plausibly  be described as a particular industry. Table 3. Regression results 
  Model: 
  I II III IV 
Dependent variable: ln(sik)        
Size variable 
Population 1.04 ***  1.04 ***  1.04  ***  1.04 *** 
Interaction channels (β
j) 
Agricultural abundance * intensity  31.44 *  32.10 *  35.16 **  35.22 ** 
Skilled labor abundance * intensity  1.83    1.81    1.97    1.96   
R&D abundance * intensity  4.04 **  4.18 **  4.66 **  4.78 ** 
Environmental laxity * poll. Intensity  1.21 **  0.40 **  1.20 **  0.41 ** 
Market potential * Sales to industry  -5.60    -5.67         
Market potential * Intermediate input use  -4.52    -4.18           
Market potential * Plant size  0.17    0.16           
Country characteristics  cut-off points (χ
j) 
Agricultural abundance  –0.02 –0.01 0.01  0.004
Skilled labor abundance  0.95 0.93 0.88  0.80
R&D abundance  0.16 0.15 0.45  0.49
Environmental standards laxity  0.23 0.24 0.21  0.26
Market potential  0.19 0.19  
 0.07 0.09  
 0.17 0.20  
Industry attributes  cut-off points (γ
j) 
Agricultural input intensity  0.46 0.45 0.42  0.41
Skilled labor intensity  1.05 1.05 1.04  1.04
R&D intensity  0.03 0.03 0.04  0.04
Pollution intensity  0.87 2.08 0.86  2.04
Sales to industry
♣  0.41 0.41  
Intermediate input use
♣  0.41 0.41  
Plant size
♣  4.09 4.09  
N  208 208 208 208
Adj. R
2  0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84
Notes: 
* is significant at 10% level. ** is significant at 5% level. *** is significant at 1%. 




7, consequently we cannot estimate γ′
5 separately from γ′
6 and γ′
7  to identify the cut off points. 
Since the first two associated industry attributes (sales, intermediate input use) are of about the same size, while the 
third attribute (plant size) is about ten times larger (Table 2), we impose γ
5 = γ
6 and  γ
7=10·γ
5, and this condition 
enables us to identify the cut off points. 
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Table 4. Standardized coefficients of interaction effects at the jointly estimated cut 
off points 
  Model: 
  III IV 
Agricultural abundance * intensity  0.298*   0.298* 
Skilled labor abundance * intensity  0.096 0.077 
R&D abundance * intensity  0.071** 0.072** 
Environmental laxity * poll. Intensity  0.096** 0.103** 
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Table 5. Marginal effects of country characteristics evaluated for the most intensive 
industries  
  Model: 
  III IV  III′ IV′ 
Agricultural abundance  -6.365  **  -6.351  **  -0.131  **  -0.131  ** 
Skilled labor abundance  1.912  *  1.909  *  0.097  *  0.097  * 
R&D abundance  1.470  **  1.502  ***  0.182  **  0.185  *** 
Environmental stand. Laxity   1.565  **  1.408  **  0.110  **  0.099  ** 
Notes: * is significant at 10% level. ** is significant at 5% level. *** is significant at 1%.  
Column (III′) and (IV′) present coefficients for normalized dependent and independent variables 
with unit s.d. 
 Table 6. Actual, predicted & counterfactual production shares  
  Agricultural input  Skilled labor input  R&D input  Environmental input 
Most intensive industry   Food, beverages & 
tobacco 




Actual shares (%) 
1. Most abundant country & its 









2. Least abundant country & its 









Predicted shares (%) 
3. Most abundant country   2.9  1.8  4.1  7.3 
4. Least abundant country   4.8  1.3  0.5  0.8 
Counterfactual shares when countries would swap abundance values (%) 
5. Most abundant country  5.2  1.2  1.7  3.1 
6. Least abundant country   2.7  1.9  1.1  2.0 
% point difference between predicted & counterfactual shares 
(3) – (5)   –2.3  0.6  2.4  4.2 
(6) – (4)  –2.1  0.6  0.6  1.2 
Note: Estimates are based on the regression with pollution intensity variable 1. 
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Austria   2.1  3.2  75.1  34  12303  67.9 
Belgium   2.7  1.9  60.6  53  13264  44.1 
Denmark   1.4  4.5  82.1  58  6627.8  67 
Finland   1.4  6.6  72.6  67  3642.1  80.5 
France   15.9  3.5  62.7  60  12380  65.8 
Germany   21.9  3  82.1  59  13073  64.2 
Greece   2.8  12.5  49.3  20  2335.7  53.1 
Italy   15.5  4.1  41.4  32  8715.1  54.3 
Netherlands 4.1  4  65.9  46  12840  66 
Portugal   2.7  7.3  23.8  31  3193.8  61.4 
Spain   10.6  5.4  35.1  32  4993.2  59.5 
Sweden   2.4  3.4  76.7  78  5810.5  77.1 
UK   15.7  2  55.3  50  12226  64.1 
Notes: definitions of variables and data sources are presented in Table 1. 
1Environmental standard laxity is therefore the inverse of these figures.  
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Table A.2. List of industries with the values of their characteristics 



















Food, beverages & tobacco  0.2579  90.2  0.0131 0.3275  0.1217 0.6152  0.26  2.23 
Textiles, apparel & leather  0.0055  70.6  0.0055 0.3109  0.6337 0.4169  0.2652  0.38 
Wood products & furniture  0.0426  75.5  0.0022 0.5273  0.9499 0.4833  0.4002  1.8 
Paper, paper products & printing  0.0035  109.6  0.007  0.6031  1.1395 0.4534  0.6878  1.4 
Industrial chemicals  0.0005  134.9  0.0658 2.17  5.4826 0.4521  0.4065  5.71 
Drugs & medicines  0.0001  140.7  0.2871 1.71  5.4826 0.4131  0.207  5.71 
Rubber & plastic products  0.0029  104.8  0.0221 0.442  1.4784 0.3688  0.5971  3.5 
Non-metallic mineral products  0.0002  103  0.012  0.8556  0.6576 0.4653  0.7484  0.98 
Iron & steel  0.0001  121.7  0.0266 1.61  4.1136 0.5411  0.673  6.26 
Non-ferrous metals  0  107.6  0.0265 1.0975  4.1136 0.3945  0.5166  15 
Metal products  0.0001  91.4  0.0101 0.4883  0.8901 0.4328  0.5504  0.65 
Non-electrical machinery  0.0001  133.8  0.289  0.3827  0.1695 0.4579  0.2144  10 
Electrical apparatus, nec.   0.0001  114.1  0.0793 0.332  0.3765 0.429  0.3785  4.67 
Radio, TV & communication 
equipment 0.0001  114.4  0.3566 0.235  0.3765 0.3979  0.2158  14.5 
Transport equipment  0.0001  119.5  0.0966 0.3671  0.4287 0.4814  0.1786  3 
Professional goods  0.0002  103.6  0.0818 0.2657  0.309 0.3802  0.1704  0.5 
Mean  0.02  108.463 0.086  0.733  1.67  0.449 0.404 4.768 
Median 0  108.6  0.027  0.465  0.774  0.442  0.389  3.25 
Notes: definitions of variables and data sources are presented in Table 1. The industry classification involves slight 
modifications from the standard ISIC Rev.2 codes, namely that sub-industries of transport equipment and of non-
electrical machinery are aggregated because of missing data for some countries. 
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